Microeconomic Theory, Matching Theory, Market Design
"Balanced House Allocation," with Rodrigo A. Velez (Job Market Paper)
Abstract: We study discrete resource allocation problems in which each agent has unit demand and strict preferences over a set of indivisible objects. These problems are known as house allocation problems. We define a new property which we call "balancedness." We characterize top trading cycles from individual endowments by Pareto efficiency, group strategy-proofness and balancedness.
“House Allocation Problems with Weak Preferences,” with Guoqiang Tian
Abstract: This paper studies house allocation problems with weak preferences. By extending the results in Abdulkadiroglu and Sonmez (1998), we show that the equivalence between simple serial dictatorships with fixed tie-breaking and top trading cycles algorithm with fixed tie-breaking, and the equivalence of random serial dictatorship and top trading cycles algorithm with random endowments still hold under weak preferences. We also show that simple serial dictatorship with fixed tie-breaking satisfies weak Pareto efficiency, strategy-proofness, non-bossiness, and consistency, and further it is not Pareto dominated by any Pareto efficient and strategy-proof rule.
Work in Progress:
"Interim Fair School Choice"
"A Theory of Wars"